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______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
          
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 The Estate of Antonio J. Palumbo (“the Estate”) 
prevailed in its suit against the United States when the 
District Court ruled it was entitled to a tax refund.  The Estate 
then sought recovery of all of its attorneys’ fees and costs 
under 26 U.S.C. § 7430, and alternatively the fees and costs it 
incurred after December 16, 2010 under the theory that the 
government rejected its qualified offer made pursuant to § 
7430(g).  Finding the position of the United States to be 
substantially justified, the District Court denied the Estate its 
fees and costs.  On appeal, the Estate argues that the position 
of the United States was not substantially justified and that 
the net worth requirements of § 7430 did not prevent it from 
recovering its fees and costs.  We will affirm. 
 
I.  
A. 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
Creation of the Charitable Trust and Will 
Contest 
In 1974, Antonio Palumbo created the A.J. and 
Sigismunda Palumbo Charitable Trust (the “Charitable 
Trust”).  Palumbo died in 2002.  During his life, he executed 
various wills and trust instruments; his last will was executed 
on July 6, 1999 (the “1999 will”).  The parties agree there 
was no express residuary provision in the 1999 will, despite 
the fact that each of Palumbo’s previous wills devised the 
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residue to the Charitable Trust.  Palumbo’s attorney admitted 
that this omission was a scrivener’s error. 
   
 The lack of a residuary clause led to a dispute over 
who was entitled to the residue.  Palumbo’s son claimed he, 
as Palumbo’s sole intestate heir, was entitled to the residue, 
while the Charitable Trust claimed it was entitled to the 
residue because of the scrivener’s error.  The two sides 
reached a settlement wherein Palumbo’s son received 
$5,600,000 along with real property in Wheeling, West 
Virginia, and the Charitable Trust received $11,721,141.1
 
  
The settlement agreement was approved by an order of the 
Orphans’ Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas of 
Elk County, Pennsylvania. 
B. 
 
Federal Estate Tax Refund and Fees and Costs 
Under § 7430 
 After the settlement, the Estate filed a claim for a 
federal estate tax charitable deduction in the amount payable 
to the Charitable Trust.  The Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue disallowed the charitable deduction, finding that the 
charitable contribution was made by Palumbo’s son via a 
settlement agreement, not by Palumbo through his 1999 will.  
The Estate thereupon brought an action against the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
seeking a refund of the federal estate tax paid on the 
$11,721,141 that was donated to the Charitable Trust.  The 
District Court granted the Estate’s motion for summary 
                                              
1 The amount Palumbo’s son received was free of all 
administrative expenses, debts, and estate and inheritance 
taxes. 
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judgment; the Estate then sought its attorneys’ fees and costs 
under 26 U.S.C. § 7430 (“§ 7430”) both as a “prevailing 
party,” which would entitle it to full recovery, and as a party 
who made a qualified offer pursuant to § 7430(g), which 
would entitle it to fees incurred after December 16, 2010. 
 
 Because the District Court found the government’s 
position in the litigation to be substantially justified, it did not 
award the Estate fees or costs.  The District Court did not 
address the net worth requirements imposed by § 7430, 
whether those requirements should apply to the Estate or the 
Charitable Trust, or the validity of the Estate’s alternative 
claim that it was entitled to certain costs because it made a 
qualified offer under 26 U.S.C. § 7430(g).  The Estate filed a 
timely notice of appeal. 
 
II.  
We have jurisdiction over the final order of the District 
Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District 
Court’s decision that the government’s position was 
substantially justified for abuse of discretion.  Nicholson v. 
Commissioner, 60 F.3d 1020, 1026 (3d Cir. 1995); see also 
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 559 (1988).  A district 
court’s ruling can only be reversed under abuse of discretion 
review if its decision was arbitrary, irrational, fanciful, clearly 
unreasonable, or based on a “clearly erroneous finding of fact, 
an errant conclusion of law, or an improper application of law 
to fact.”  United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 184 (3d Cir. 
2010).  We will not upset a district court’s exercise of 
discretion “‘unless no reasonable person would adopt the 
district court’s view.’”  United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 
Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
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196, 214 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ansell v. Green Acres 
Contracting Co., 347 F.3d 515, 519 (3d Cir. 2003)). 
   
III.  
A. 
Analysis 
 
Fee Provision Statute 
 In court proceedings “brought by or against the United 
States in connection with the determination, collection, or 
refund of any tax,” a “prevailing party” may recover fees and 
costs incurred in the litigation.  26 U.S.C. § 7430(a).  
“Prevailing party” is defined in § 7430(c)(4): 
 
(A) In general.--The term “prevailing party” 
means any party in any proceeding to which 
subsection (a) applies (other than the United 
States or any creditor of the taxpayer involved) 
-- 
 
(i) which--  
 
(I) has substantially prevailed with respect to 
the amount in controversy, or  
 
(II) has substantially prevailed with respect to 
the most significant issue or set of issues 
presented, and  
 
(ii) which meets the requirements of the 1st 
sentence of section 2412(d)(1)(B) of Title 28, 
United States Code (as in effect on October 22, 
1986) except to the extent differing procedures 
are established by rule of court and meets the 
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requirements of section 2412(d)(2)(B) of such 
Title 28 (as so in effect). 
 
In referencing 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B), the statute 
incorporates the net worth restrictions set forth in the Equal 
Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”).2
   
  Under the EAJA, the 
recovery of fees and costs is barred if a party’s net worth 
exceeds the statutory amount.  Moreover, the party seeking 
fees has the burden of proving that it meets the net worth 
requirements under § 7430.  Tax Ct. R. 232(e); Estate of Woll 
v. Commissioner, 44 F.3d 464, 470 (7th Cir. 1994). 
Congress included a special rule in § 7430 that applied 
the net worth requirement to estates.  Section 7430(c)(4)(D) 
states that the $2,000,000 net worth requirement imposed on 
individuals in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(i) shall apply to “an 
estate but shall be determined as of the date of the decedent’s 
death.”  The rule appears to codify Estate of Hubberd v. 
Comm’r, 99 T.C. 335 (1992).3
                                              
2 The EAJA is codified at 5 U.S.C. § 504 and 28 U.S.C. § 
2412. 
  At the time Hubberd was 
decided, § 7430 did not contain a special rule subjecting an 
estate to the $2,000,000 net worth requirement.  The Hubberd 
court decided that an estate was subject to the net worth 
requirement set forth in § 2412.  Id. at 341.  The court 
rejected the estate’s argument that when applying the net 
worth requirement a court should “consider the net worth of 
the [estate’s] beneficiaries, not the net worth of the estate.”  
Id. at 339.  The court explained its reasoning as follows: 
3 The rule was added to § 7430 via the Taxpayer Relief Act of 
1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat 788. 
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[The Commissioner] determined a deficiency 
against the estate.  This case is brought in the 
name of and on behalf of the estate by its 
executor.  This action is for a redetermination of 
the estate tax deficiency.  An estate is generally 
responsible for bearing the costs of its own 
litigation.  It follows that we look to the net 
worth of the estate, and not of the beneficiaries 
or the executor. 
 
Id. at 340–41 (citations omitted).4
Unlike estates, charitable organizations exempt from 
taxation under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue 
Code need not satisfy any net worth requirement to recover 
fees and costs.  Such an organization, however, cannot 
recover fees and costs if it had “more than 500 employees at 
the time the civil action was filed.”  26 U.S.C. § 
2412(d)(2)(B)(ii).  
  
  
 The appellant cites legislative history in the form of 
the Conference Report to the Tax Equity and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act of 1982, the bill that enacted § 7430.  The 
applicable Senate Amendment, which was adopted by the 
Conference, stated “Third-party costs.—A taxpayer may 
recover costs for a third party incurred by that party on behalf 
of the taxpayer.”  H.R. Rep. No. 97-760, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. 
687 (1982). 
                                              
4 The Hubberd court did not decide whether clause (i) or (ii) 
of § 2412(d)(1)(B) was applicable because the estate’s net 
worth exceeded the limit stated in each provision. 
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 Here, in addition to seeking fees and costs as a 
“prevailing party” under § 7430, the Estate seeks to recover 
under the qualified offer provision of § 7430(g).  A qualified 
offer under § 7430(g): (1) is made by the taxpayer to the 
United States within the qualified offer period [which starts 
on the date that the first letter of proposed deficiency is sent 
to the taxpayer, and ends 30 days before the date the case is 
first set for trial]; (2) specifies the offered amount of the 
taxpayer’s liability; (3) is designated at the time it is made as 
a qualified offer; and (4) remains open during the period 
beginning on the date it is made, and ending at the earliest of: 
the date the offer is rejected, the date of trial, or the ninetieth 
day after the offer is made.  If the offer fails to meet the 
requirements, a party cannot receive litigation fees and costs.  
McGowan v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2005-80, 2005 WL 
826928 at *2 (2005). 
   
Parties seeking to recover under either the prevailing 
party provision or the qualified offer provision must satisfy 
the net worth requirements discussed above.5
                                              
5 Section 7430(c)(4)(B) states a “party shall not be treated as 
the prevailing party” if the position of the United States is 
“substantially justified.”  Courts look to published guidance 
(regulations, revenue rulings, etc) as well as the decisions of 
courts of appeal on substantially similar issues in making this 
determination.  The “substantially justified” limitation does 
not apply to qualified offers. See Swanson v. Comm’r, 98 
T.C.M. (CCH) 42 (2009) (“The qualified offer provision of 
section 7430(c)(4)(E)(i) applies without regard to whether the 
Commissioner’s position in the matter is substantially 
justified.”).   This ground will not be discussed in this opinion 
and does not affect our resolution of the case. 
  Because the 
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resolution of the net worth issue disposes of both issues, we 
will resolve this case on that ground despite the fact that the 
District Court did not address it.  See Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 
132, 138 n.2 (1982) (“It is well accepted . . . an appellee may 
rely upon any matter appearing in the record in support of the 
judgment below.”). 
 
B. 
It is undisputed that the Estate’s net worth at the time 
of the decedent’s death was greater than $2,000,000, and that, 
as a result, the Estate cannot qualify for fees and costs under 
either of its claims.  The Charitable Trust, however, satisfies 
the net worth requirements because it is a tax-exempt 
charitable organization with fewer than 500 employees.  The 
Estate has thus argued that the Charitable Trust is the real 
party in interest and that the Charitable Trust, not the Estate, 
qualifies as a prevailing party who incurred fees. 
Application of § 7430 Requirements 
   
The crux of the Estate’s argument is that because the 
Charitable Trust was the sole residuary beneficiary under the 
settlement agreement, it bore all the expenses incurred to 
obtain the tax refund, reaped all the benefits of the tax refund, 
and will reap the benefit of any attorneys’ fees and costs 
recovered.  In support of its argument, the Estate cites a 
number of cases that looked beyond the named plaintiff and 
aimed to determine whether “the real party in interest” could 
be awarded fees,  see, e.g., Young v. Commissioner, T.C. 
Memo. 2006-189, 2006 WL 2564109 (2006), as well as 
legislative history, see H.R. Rep. No. 97-760, 97th Cong. 2d 
Sess. 687 (1982).  The Estate asserts that these arguments 
show the Charitable Trust was the “prevailing party” for the 
purposes of fee recovery under § 7430.  We disagree.  The 
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fact that the Charitable Trust stood to benefit from the Estate 
obtaining a tax refund, as well as any award of fees, does not 
mean that it was a “prevailing party” that incurred fees as is 
required under § 7430. 
   
If the terms of a statute are unambiguous, the plain 
meaning of the statute will govern.  See Reves v. Ernst & 
Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177 (1993) (“If the statutory language 
is unambiguous, in the absence of a clearly expressed 
legislative intent to the contrary, that language must 
ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.” (citations omitted)); 
Rubin v. United States, 499 U.S. 424, 430 (1981) (“When we 
find the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is 
complete, except in rare and exceptional circumstances.” 
(citations omitted)). 
   
The definition section of § 7430 sets forth the criteria 
for determining a prevailing party.  First, an individual or 
entity must be a “party in any proceeding” covered by § 
7430(a).  See § 7430(a) (stating it applies to “any 
administrative or court proceeding which is brought by or 
against the United States in connection with the 
determination, collection, or refund of any tax”).  Second, the 
party must “substantially prevail[] with respect to the amount 
in controversy” or “substantially prevail[] with respect to the 
most significant issue or set of issues presented.”  § 7430 
(c)(4)(A)(i)(I) & (II).  Finally, as previously mentioned, the 
definition of prevailing party excludes any party that fails to 
satisfy the net worth requirements of § 2412(d)(1)(B).  § 
7430(c)(4)(A)(ii). 
   
In this case the Estate was the party in the underlying 
proceeding.  The executor of the Estate was (1) responsible 
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for paying the appropriate amount of federal estate tax, see 26 
U.S.C. § 2002 (“The tax imposed by this chapter shall be paid 
by the executor.”); (2) the party with the legal right to seek a 
refund of taxes paid; and (3) the party that conducted the 
litigation.  The settlement agreement between the Charitable 
Trust and Palumbo’s son explicitly states that the “residuary 
estate will be solely responsible for the payment of all 
inheritance and estate taxes payable as a result of the 
Decedent’s death.”  App. II at 87 ¶ 6.  Further, the Estate was 
the only party to the proceedings, and it was the only party 
that prevailed in connection with the proceedings. 
   
In addition to satisfying the prevailing party 
requirements, a party seeking fees under § 7430 must incur 
the litigation expenses attendant to that proceeding.  Section 
7430(c)(1)(B)(iii) states only reasonable fees “paid or 
incurred” for the services of an attorney are reimbursable.  In 
order to recover fees under § 7430 a prevailing party must 
actually incur the costs.  Marre v. United States, 38 F.3d 823, 
829 (5th Cir. 1994) (litigant “entitled only to the amount 
owed under the contingency fee agreement plus costs”);  
Young, 2006 WL 2564109 at *9 (T.C. 2006) (“Unlike certain 
other fee-shifting statutes, section 7430 generally allows the 
recovery of attorney fees only to the extent such amounts 
have been paid or incurred.” 6
                                              
6 We note that we are not dealing with the situation where a 
non-party has advanced the funds to pay the fees and the 
plaintiff is either liable to repay them, or that repayment is 
contingent upon recovery.  See Morrison v. Comm’r, 565 
F.3d 658, 662 (9th Cir. 2009); SEC v. Comserv. Corp., 908 
F.2d 1407, 1414 (8th Cir. 1990). 
).  Unlike the term “prevailing 
party,” “incur” is not defined by § 7430 so we must assume 
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the legislature intended the ordinary meaning of the word to 
apply.  Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993) 
(“When a word is not defined by statute, we normally 
construe it in accord with its ordinary or natural meaning.”).  
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “incur” as “to suffer or bring 
on oneself (a liability or expense).”  Black’s Law Dictionary 
at 836 (9th ed. 2009). 
   
This definition is consistent with the Tax Court’s 
statement “[f]or purposes of section 7430, fees are ‘incurred’ 
when there is a legal obligation to pay them.”  Young, 2006 
WL 2564109 at *9.  Here, the Estate “suffered or brought on” 
itself the fees it had the legal obligation to pay.  The Estate 
paid the attorneys’ fees and expenses and was the party in the 
underlying litigation represented by those attorneys.  It is thus 
clear that the Estate was the prevailing party who incurred the 
expenses related to the litigation. 
   
The Estate’s argument that we should look at the sole 
residuary beneficiary, the Charitable Trust, cannot be 
reconciled with the plain language of the statute and the 
ordinary meaning of its terms, and therefore must be rejected.  
Since the Charitable Trust was not a party to the underlying 
suit, it cannot be a prevailing party nor can it incur expenses 
as contemplated by the statute.7
                                              
7 The Charitable Trust did hire an attorney to work on the 
matter, and his expenses accounted for slightly less than 20% 
of the total amount sought by the Estate.  We do not believe 
that the Charitable Trust’s legal expenses are the type covered 
by § 7430.  Section 7430 aims to ensure “that every citizen is 
able to defend himself against unjustified government action, 
free from the financial disincentives associated with 
  The fact that it stands to 
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benefit from the Estate’s victory, and that it hired an attorney 
to help in the litigation, cannot change the result that it does 
not qualify under § 7430. 
   
By their nature, decedents’ estates deal with resources 
that will be passed along to other individuals or entities.  See 
Black’s Law Dictionary at 629 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a 
decedent’s estate as “The real and personal property that a 
person possesses at the time of death and that passes to the 
heirs or testamentary beneficiaries”).  If an individual or 
entity is the residual beneficiary of an estate, that separate 
individual or entity will indirectly bear the estate’s fees.  Yet, 
§ 7430 requires courts to analyze an estate’s, not its 
beneficiary’s, net worth, and courts must make such a 
determination “as of the date of the decedent’s death.”  The 
mere existence of an indirect consequence on the residual 
beneficiary does not alter the application of the plain meaning 
of the statute. 
 
The Conference Report cited by the Estate does not 
provide persuasive evidence that Congress intended a 
different result.  Although the Senate Amendment, officially 
adopted by the Conference Report, stated “[a] taxpayer may 
recover costs for a third party incurred by that party on behalf 
of the taxpayer,” a number of hurdles were inserted into § 
7430.  Taxpayers must clear those hurdles before recovering 
fees.  To that end, we do not read the Senate Amendment in 
the Conference Report as negating, or casting aside, the 
                                                                                                     
litigation.”  Morrison, 565 F.3d at 659.  The Charitable Trust 
did not participate in such litigation to protect its rights; it 
merely hired counsel that advised it, and helped the Estate, in 
the Estate’s participation in such litigation.  
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different barriers to recovery placed in § 7430.  The taxpayer, 
here the Estate, must still qualify as a prevailing party under § 
7430 before it can recover any costs for third parties that 
those parties incurred on its behalf. 
 
The application of the statutory language to this case is 
clear: we are to look at the Estate’s net worth since it was the 
taxpayer that pursued its substantive legal rights in the 
underlying action.  See also Hubberd, 99 T.C. at 341 
(examining estate’s net worth because the estate must pay 
taxes, the case was brought in name of estate by executor, and 
estate is “generally responsible for bearing the costs of its 
own litigation”).  The relevant point in time for determining 
the value of the estate is its value at the time of Palumbo’s 
death.  It is undisputed that the Estate’s net worth exceeded 
$2,000,000.  As a result, the Estate is not eligible to recover 
fees and costs under § 7430. 
 
C. 
 
Decisions Focusing on the “Real Party of 
Interest” 
The Estate’s discussion of case law regarding the real-
party-in-interest doctrine does not dissuade us from our 
conclusion.  We now examine this case law and explain why 
we believe it does not dictate a different result. 
 
One of the first decisions to apply the real-party-in-
interest doctrine to the EAJA was Unification Church v. 
I.N.S., 762 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1985).  The United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held 
that courts should determine the real party in interest in the 
fee litigation and decide whether that party is eligible to 
recover fees.  In the underlying litigation, the Unification 
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Church agreed to pay the attorneys’ fees for three of its 
employees in their dealings with the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, and joined the suit as a named 
plaintiff.  Id. at 1082; see also Unification Church v. I.N.S., 
547 F. Supp. 623 (D.D.C. 1982).  The employees and Church 
were successful, and the Church sought to recover, through 
the EAJA, the fees it paid on behalf of the employees.  Id. at 
1079.  The court decided that the Church was the real party in 
interest because it had incurred all of the fees, and would be 
the beneficiary of any award of fees.  Id. at 1082.  Despite the 
fact each employee was individually eligible to recover, the 
Church was prevented from recovering because it had more 
than 500 employees. 
   
The court explained that if it “were to award fees in 
this case on the basis that the individual appellants qualified 
under subsection (d)(2)(B)(i), [it] would open the door for the 
wholesale subversion of Congress's intent to prevent large 
entities from receiving fees under subsection (d).”  Id.  The 
D.C. Circuit feared that “[i]n a wide variety of circumstances, 
organizations obviously not qualified for an award under 
subsection (d) would be able to persuade individuals to be 
among the parties, and the organization would then receive 
free legal services if its side were to prevail.”  Id.  The court 
could not “allow such a situation.”  Id.  As a result the court 
held that “where the fee arrangement among the plaintiffs is 
such that only some of them will be liable for attorney's fees, 
the court shall consider only the qualification vel non under 
the [EAJA] of those parties that will be themselves liable for 
fees if court-awarded fees are denied.”  Id.  
 
The Estate also argues the decision in Wall Industries 
v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 796 (1988), aff’d in unpublished 
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opinion, 883 F.2d 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1989), supports the 
extension of the real-party-in-interest doctrine.  In that 
decision the court denied the taxpayer-plaintiff fees under the 
EAJA because it was not the real party in interest. 
 
Wall Industries Inc. (“Wall”), the taxpayer and 
plaintiff in the action, filed suit seeking a tax refund.  Wall, 
however, entered into an agreement with its accounting firm, 
Arthur Young (“Young”), whereby Young paid Wall 
$291,045 to settle a potential malpractice claim against 
Young for failing to file the refund claim.  Wall Indus., 15 Cl. 
Ct. at 799.  As a condition of the settlement, Wall granted to 
Young full responsibility for litigating the tax refund claim 
and any refund proceeds resulting from that litigation.  Id.  
Therefore, Young conducted the litigation, paid for the 
litigation, and would receive any and all benefit from the 
litigation.  Id.  The court stated “[a] thorough analysis of the 
settlement agreement between Young and Wall discloses that 
there is no question that Young, in actuality, required Wall to 
initiate this suit as a condition of the payment of $291,045, 
and that Wall is little more than a nominal applicant.”  Id. at 
804. 
 
After Wall prevailed and obtained a refund, it sought 
fees under the EAJA.  The court found that Wall was not 
eligible for fees because it “never assumed any responsibility 
to pay for legal services and would derive no benefit from an 
award herein . . . .”  Id. at 805.  The court found that Young 
was the real party in interest because it, not Wall, “actively 
and continuously participated” in the litigation and “stood 
alone to benefit.”  Id.  The court then analyzed whether 
Young, not Wall, could qualify under the net worth 
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provisions, and denied fees because of Young’s net worth and 
size.  Id at 806. 
 
Here, the Estate argues that because, in its view, the 
Charitable Trust “actively and continuously participated” in 
the litigation and “stood alone to benefit,” it must be 
considered the real party in interest, just like the Unification 
Church in Unification Church, and Young in Wall Industries.  
The Estate errs in relation to both cases. 
 
In both Unification Church and Wall Industries, the 
real party in interest had a legal arrangement that made it 
responsible for the fees.  See also Love v. Reilly, 924 F.2d 
1492, 1494 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The members of the 
[association] would be the real party in interest in the fee 
litigation only if they were liable for the [association’s] 
attorney's fees.”).  The Charitable Trust had no such 
arrangement that made it liable or responsible for the fees.  
The Estate argues that as the sole residuary beneficiary the 
Charitable Trust did ultimately bear the fees.  The Charitable 
Trust, however, did not directly bear the costs of these fees in 
the manner that the Unification Church and Young did.  The 
Unification Church and Young paid the costs directly out of 
their pocket, whereas the Estate paid the costs out of its 
pocket and the Charitable Trust will only indirectly bear the 
costs after it receives a smaller distribution.  In fact, the Estate 
is in a more analogous position to Young and the Unification 
Church than the Charitable Trust because the Estate, like 
those organizations, directly paid the costs of litigation. 
   
Other differences render Unification Church and Wall 
Industries legally distinguishable from the current matter.  
First, the Unification Church was an actual party to the 
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underlying suit, whereas the Charitable Trust was not.  
Second, Young contracted for any tax refund obtained and 
was thus legally entitled to it.  By contrast, the tax refund 
obtained by the Estate will go to the Estate, and the 
Charitable Trust has no legal claim to it.  The Charitable 
Trust will benefit after the Estate obtains that refund and 
passes it along in the proper manner, but that does not mean 
that the Charitable Trust possesses the legal right, as Young 
did, to the refund.  But the essential difference is that neither 
of these cases authorized payment under the EAJA to entities 
that were not parties to the underlying suit.  Courts have 
rejected assertions by non-parties that they were eligible for 
EAJA fees because they were the real parties in interest.  Sw. 
Marine, Inc. v. United States, 43 F.3d 420, 422 (9th Cir. 
1994); S.E.C. v. Comserv Corp., 908 F.2d 1407, 1413 (8th 
Cir. 1990); Am. Bayridge Corp. v. United States, 24 C.I.T. 9, 
10-12 (2000).  For that reason, the real-party-in-interest 
doctrine, as applied to the EAJA, does not support the 
Estate’s claim. 
 
Though the above discussion explains why judicial 
interpretations of the real-party-in-interest doctrine pertaining 
to the EAJA do not militate in favor of the Estate’s position, 
we must also discuss the cases, cited by the Estate, that apply 
the real-party-in-interest doctrine to § 7430.  See Young, 2006 
WL 2564109; Dixon v. Comm’r, 91 T.C.M. 1138, 2006 WL 
1275497 (2006), aff’d on other grounds, 612 F.3d 890 (9th 
Cir. 2010).  A careful analysis of these decisions reveals that 
they provide little support for, and run counter to, the Estate’s 
position. 
   
In Young and Dixon, the Tax Court addressed both test 
and nontest cases involving taxpayers who had invested in a 
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specific tax shelter.  The analysis in these two decisions 
applies to a small portion of tax litigation cases and provides 
a narrow exception to an otherwise clear rule.  Specifically, 
both Young and Dixon arise from the tax shelter programs 
promoted by Henry F.K. Kersting during the 1970’s and 
1980’s.  The shelters spawned more than 1,000 docketed 
cases after the Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed 
interest deductions claimed by participants in the shelters.  
Young, 2006 WL 2564109 at *1.  Test cases proceeded, while 
nontest case petitioners entered into agreements whereby their 
cases would be resolved in accordance with the outcome of 
the test cases.  Id.  A “Defense Fund” was organized and 
“nontest case petitioners shared the further costs of the test 
case litigation.”  Id. at *2. 
 
In Young, the Tax Court held “that the real parties in 
interest in th[e] litigation include not only the test case 
petitioners and participating nontest case petitioners, but also 
all other remaining nontest case petitioners.”  Id. at *8 
(quoting Dixon, 2006 WL 1275497 at *9).  The court stated 
“the fact that petitioners have not, by and large, paid or 
incurred the claimed fees and expenses does not render those 
amounts unrecoverable under section 7430.”  Id. at *10 
(quoting Dixon, 2006 WL 1275497 at *9).  As the court 
noted, “the relevant inquiry is . . . whether the real parties in 
interest who did pay or incur those amounts satisfy the net 
worth requirement” imposed by § 7430 and § 2412.  Id. 
(quoting Dixon, 2006 WL 1275497 at *9). 
   
Here, we are dealing with a factual situation very 
different from Young and Dixon.  In those decisions many of 
the taxpayers had filed petitions in the Tax Court regarding 
related issues, and had done so because they had rights at 
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stake in the decisions.  The petitioners in Young and Dixon 
had similar rights in the tax shelter; the resolution of one case, 
therefore, would determine the legal rights of many others.  
To that end over 300 nontest case petitioners had contributed 
to the Defense Fund. 
   
Conversely, the resolution of the Estate’s tax refund 
proceeding does not determine the Charitable Trust’s rights in 
a similar proceeding; the Charitable Trust is not a nontest 
case petitioner waiting to learn how the courts will rule on its 
tax interests.  While the nontest case petitioners had legal 
claims dependent on the resolution of the test cases’ 
outcomes, the Charitable Trust has no legal claim of its own 
that is dependent on the outcome of the Estate’s tax litigation.  
The fact that the Charitable Trust will suffer an indirect 
pecuniary consequence from the Estate’s litigation does not 
elevate that consequence to an independent legal claim.  The 
Charitable Trust is thus more akin to the spouse of one of the 
test case petitioners who stands to gain only through the 
resolution of another’s legal rights, not the legal rights of its 
own. 
 
In Dixon, the Tax Court stated the “case for looking 
beyond the named parties [was] particularly compelling in 
the[] proceedings, where similarly situated taxpayers not only 
shared the costs of the litigation but also ‘had rights at stake 
in the case on the merits.’”  Dixon, 2006 WL 1275497 at *9.  
We believe Dixon’s exception is narrowly cabined to 
situations involving complex tax litigation where similarly 
situated taxpayers have foregone individual litigation to 
further their independent legal claims and shared in the costs 
of the representative litigation.  It is not applicable to 
situations, such as those present in this case, where an estate 
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has a sole residuary beneficiary that has no independent legal 
claim and will only be affected indirectly by the outcome of 
the Estate’s litigation. 
 
For the reasons discussed above we do not believe that 
any of the decisions applying the real-party-in-interest 
doctrine dictate that we classify the Charitable Trust as the 
real party in interest.  The application of the statutory 
language shows that the Estate was the prevailing party who 
incurred the costs, and therefore is the party who must meet 
the net worth requirements of § 2412 incorporated into § 
7430.  To look through the Estate and query whether the 
beneficiary, or beneficiaries, qualified for recovery of fees 
under § 7430 would complicate an otherwise straightforward 
analysis.  It would also make § 7340(c)(4)(D) superfluous 
because we would never consider the net worth requirement 
imposed on estates, let alone at the specific time Congress 
required.  We decline reading such a rule into the statute. 
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court properly 
denied the Estate the fees and costs it sought.  Accordingly, 
we will affirm the District Court’s opinion. 
